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bstract
We first illustrate that emerging markets (EMs) face a shortage of financial assets, with financial assets not growing as rapidly as domestic
avings. An estimation to quantify the asset shortage in EMs for 1995–2008 is then undertaken. A theoretical model is developed to explain why
sset shortages occur. We then econometrically estimate the causes of asset shortages, and conclude with policy implications.
2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
EL classiﬁcation: E22; E40; G0
eywords: Asset shortage; Emerging market; Capital market; Regulation
i
m
e
t
i
a
A
c
M
o
d
a
t
C
s
o
A
t
p
 
 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.. Introduction
Capital markets in emerging markets (EMs) have expanded
apidly in recent years, with demand for assets expected to grow
trongly for the foreseeable future. Following the 1980s crisis
n Latin America and the 1990s crisis in East Asia, most EMs
ndertook bold reforms, encompassing fiscal orthodoxy, pre-
ictable monetary policies, and other structural reforms that led
o a strengthening of the balance sheets of both the public and
rivate sectors. The ensuing macroeconomic stability was not
aterially affected by the 2008 global credit crisis, with macro-
conomic stability remaining intact and balance sheets still
obust. Rising domestic savings—in the form of increasingly
apitalized pension and mutual funds and reduced financing
eeds of public entities—and the increasing demand for EM
ssets from local and foreign investors, insurance companies,
nd other financial intermediaries, have led to greater appetite
or domestic equity, bonds, and other financial assets.
The paradox of the improved macroeconomic environment
n EMs is that while savings have remained strong or even∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 202 623 9536.
E-mail addresses: jchen@imf.org (J. Chen), pimam@imf.org (P. Imam).
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ncreased, the supply of financial assets has not risen com-
ensurately. High equity returns, a stable macroeconomic
nvironment and increasing assets under management by institu-
ional investors have not led to the takeoff of the primary market
n most EMs. Equity issuances/Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
re still infrequent, though there are regional variations. Whereas
sian companies tend to issue domestically, Latin American
ompanies are biased toward raising capital overseas instead.
ost domestic fixed income markets are highly underdevel-
ped and dominated by public debt; outside public short-term
ebt, most fixed-income products remain illiquid (de la Torre
nd Schmukler, 2006).
The constraint to expanding domestic assets is partly struc-
ural, related to market size. Outside Brazil, Russia, India, and
hina (BRIC), most EMs are small economies, which limits the
cope for deep domestic financial markets. The selective nature
f issuers—mainly companies in the mining sector in Latin
merica or manufacturing companies in East Asia—restricts
he benefit of diversification for investors. Corporate culture also
lays a part in explaining why entities and controlling sharehol-
ers are reluctant to relinquish control over firms.
The lack of domestically investible assets, if not addressed,
ould potentially lead to large macroeconomic imbalances that
hreaten stability. A shortage of investible assets leads to excess
iquidity that lowers interest rates and raises asset prices on
quity and housing. Moreover, the dominance of buy and hold
nvestors leads to fewer transactions, which raises the entry and
xit costs into the stock market. In any case, share prices are not
ood indicators of actual market prices in illiquid and underde-
eloped markets. They suffer from a shortage of information and
igh spreads, and are prone to be affected by ‘noise traders’ and
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tive to the economic fundamentals. The recurrent speculative
bubbles observed in EM economies are a reflection of these
misalignments.1
1 While only anecdotal, the last few decades have seen increases in bubbles,
which have become more frequent across more financial assets. Mexican and
other Latin American debt suffered from a crash in 1982 and again in 1994; stock
of the Asian Tiger economies came back to earth in 1997; China, and with it0
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Fig. 1. Asset issuan
arge swings in price volatility. The shortage of domestic finan-
ial assets, combined with investment restrictions abroad, could
ead to bubbles with too much capital chasing too few assets.
arket efficiency is also affected, as in a world of imperfect cap-
tal mobility—owing to investment restrictions—misalignments
n asset valuation relative to the economic fundamentals can be
ong lasting.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe
sset shortages and their symptoms; in Section 3, we discuss
ossible causes of asset shortages. The asset shortage index is
odeled in Section 4, and constructed in Section 5, followed in
ection 6 by an estimate of the factors driving asset shortages.
ection 7 concludes with policy implications.
. What are asset shortages and what are the
ymptoms?
EMs are producing too few financial assets relative to ris-
ng savings levels, leading to asset shortages. This is not a new
henomenon. Other countries have been able to grow rapidly
ithout issuing substantial amounts of financial assets, such as
ommunist countries in the past or oil-producing nations today.
herefore, an economy’s ability to produce output is only imper-
ectly linked to its ability to generate financial assets (Caballero,
006). As illustrated below (Fig. 1), although EM asset issuance,
s a share of GDP, has increased since 1990, it is still low relative
o GDP, and does not grow one-to-one with GDP.
For asset shortages to exist there must be market imper-
ections; otherwise interest rates would balance the supply
nd demand for assets. Either savings are not responsive
o interest rates (and there is a lot of empirical evidence
uggesting that savings are indeed highly inelastic relative
o interest rates) or the supply of assets is not responsive
o interest rates alone. Also, capital markets are subject to
arket inefficiencies—noncompetitive markets lead to high
ransaction costs, information asymmetry—and these problems
re particularly severe in EMs.
Prior to the EM crises of the 1990s, EMs grew rapidly,
ith high savings rates accompanied by high investment rates.
owever, while savings rates have remained high, investment
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emerging markets.
ates have started to decline following the Asian crisis, leading
o a shortage of financial assets in these countries (Rajan, 2006).
he shortage was exacerbated by the rapid growth of savings in
hina and in commodity producing countries that do not gen-
rate financial assets on a sufficient scale to satisfy demand for
hem (Caballero, 2006).
Fewer investment opportunities in EMs have resulted in asset
hortages, with negative implications for both the macroecon-
my and financial markets. Investment opportunities have been
estrained by the inability to issue financial assets in EMs.
merging bottlenecks in capital markets, with too much money
hasing too few assets, have given rise to some perverse conse-
uences for market efficiency. These include:
Lowreal interest rates. With too much savings chasing too few
investments, real interest rates are kept low (by historical stan-
dards) (see also GFSR, 2005). Low interest rates are in turn
pushing economic agents into higher-risk assets, searching
for yields and bringing real interest rates down further.
Illiquid capital markets in EMs. The lack of liquidity in many
EM capital markets is a result of investors trying to grab any
assets they can and holding on to them. The mismatch leads to
buy and hold strategies by investors and concentrated owner-
ship, leading to illiquidity in domestic capital markets (and
lending itself to market misconduct and price manipulation).
Misalignment in the valuation of assets, leading to bubbles in
extreme cases. A mismatch between asset supply and demand
may lead to sustained misalignments in asset valuation rela-ommodity prices, peaked in 2007, and prices have fallen since. EM stock, cur-
encies, credit, and other commodities once operated in their separate kingdoms
nd followed their own rules. Now, given asset shortages, they increasingly are
nterlinked financial assets; and when one market expands with the inflow of
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While investors in EMs often are keen to invest their
assets overseas as a store of value, worsening macroeconomic
conditions of advanced economies in recent years, compared to4 J. Chen, P. Imam / Review of D
Capital ﬂows from EMs to advanced economies (AEs). The
Lucas paradox, that capital is flowing from EMs to advanced
countries, is again a symptom of asset shortages in EMs. With
a limited amount of assets to invest in, savers in EMs invest
their savings overseas. Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are
an extreme form of asset shortage, with massive savings in
EMs not absorbed by the domestic economy, because of the
lack of financial assets.
. What causes asset shortages?
Asset shortages have become severe in the last two decades
n EMs, owing to a combination of (i) the dwindling supply
f financial assets, (ii) the increased supply of domestic sav-
ngs, (iii) regulatory restrictions on what assets institutional
nvestors can purchase, and (iv) other factors. Let us look at them
n turn.
.1. Dwindling supply of ﬁnancial assets in EMs
.1.1. Fiscal improvements
Government fiscal policy is a key source of the supply of
nancial assets. According to the ‘Original Sin’ line of reason-
ng (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999; Hausmann and Panizza,
010), most EM governments and corporations are unable to bor-
ow in local currency, due to shallow domestic capital markets
nd the unwillingness of investors to fund large investments in an
M currency, with the side effect of leading to a lack of supply of
omestic financial assets. Several EM countries have improved
heir overall sovereign debt management practices, by increasing
he share of domestic-currency denominated debt. Nonetheless,
lthough the issuance of domestic debt has recently increased
hereby raising the supply of domestic financial assets, the orig-
nal sin has declined only marginally and only in a few countries
Hausmann and Panizza, 2010). Given original sin, abstinence
f debt has become an important strategy in EMs, with govern-
ents running orthodox fiscal policies, but thereby supplying
ew financial assets.
.1.2. High uncertainty
EMs have been subject to severe and repeated shocks in the
ast two decades, most notably the Asian crisis, which created
igh risk averseness. Banking systems in Asia and Latin America
ave been highly regulated since, forced to keep high liquidity
uffers and capital ratios, which has created a stable bank-
ng system, though also a conservative one often constraining
redit growth. In addition, poor property rights, weak contract
nforcement, and judicial arbitrariness are just a few problems
hat by increasing uncertainty, constrain investment and lead
o low private rates of return (owing to low appropriability).
hile most EMs have made great progress in addressing these
oney, many risky assets shoot upward simultaneously, forming synchronized
ubbles. In such a case, the right policy response is not to hike interest rates to
urst the bubble but, rather, to help manage such massive systemic risk.
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roblems over time, this has not been enough to address asset
hortages.2
.2. Increased supply of domestic savings
.2.1. Pension reform
Pension reforms in Latin America, increasing commodity
rices in the Middle East and Africa, and rising savings in East
sia have contributed to an increasing supply of savings in EMs.
hile one could have expected rising consumption levels and
alling savings with rising income per capita, pension reforms
nd positive exogenous shocks in the form of rising commodity
rices or rising demand for export products have tended to lead
o high saving rates.
.2.2. Underdeveloped capital markets
Savings in EMs are motivated in part to fund lumpy
hysical investments, because underdeveloped capital mar-
ets require agents to save on a massive scale and over an
xtended period of time. As EMs industrialize, and as invest-
ent requirements increase substantially, credit-constrained
nvestors require ever larger savings to finance lumpy invest-
ents. Investors have to accumulate a large share of the savings
efore they can ever invest, leading to an increase in domestic
avings.
.3. Regulatory restrictions
.3.1. Regulatory restrictions on agents
A substantial portion of the world’s desired savings is
ut to work by governments, central banks, and financial
nstitutions like insurance companies. Many of these agents
re ordered by law to buy fixed-income products, such as
omestic government bonds, and are constrained in regard to
nvestments in certain assets classes, including foreign assets
Box 1).
.3.2. Regulation restricting supply of risky ﬁnancial assets
Many EMs (e.g., China) do not allow issuance of high-yield
ebt or other financial assets. This prevents the development
f a whole asset class in such countries, thereby restricting the
upply of financial assets.
.4. Other reasons for asset shortages in EMs
.4.1. Home bias (for political reasons)2 Past investment excesses. One argument, advanced by Rajan (2006), is that
ast booms are still working themselves through the system. Following past
verinvestment, investment overhang still needs some time to pass through
he system. In other words, past misallocations of investment are still haunt-
ng current investment expenditure. Corporations are therefore cautious in their
nvestment strategy to avoid over investment that could haunt them. While there
s some plausibility to this argument, it is a temporary phenomenon.
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Box 1: Regulatory restrictions of Latin Amer-
ican pension funds.
Chile was the pioneer in pension reform in
Latin America, and its model was copied
throughout Latin America. In 1981, a compre-
hensive change took place in the pension system,
changing the state-run, deﬁned-beneﬁt scheme to
a deﬁned-contribution system managed entirely
by the private sector (by pension management
companies called “AFPs”), under the supervision
of a dedicated government agency, the Super-
intendency of AFP. Chile introduced mandatory
individual savings accounts in the early 1980s;
later, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay followed suit, borrow-
ing heavily on the Chileanmodel (Borensztein and
others, 2008).
The system’s investment opportunities are
heavily regulated. The regulator of pension
funds in all these Latin American countries sets
strict regulations on foreign exposure, ranging
from single-digit limits to about one-third of the
funds. Both foreign and domestic ﬁxed income
investments typically are restricted to high-grade
entities, funds for the government, and local
blue-chip companies. Exposure to equity is also
highly restricted, again only to blue-chip compa-
nies. Pension fund investments have given rise
to abnormally low corporate bond spreads, well
below sovereign spreads. The upward trend in
stock prices is attributed partly to the demand
exerted by these pension funds. This brings
about some perverse consequences for market
efﬁciency: prices may become misaligned from
fundamentals; and liquidity is continually drained
from the market place.
Restricting investment opportunities for
pension funds reduces the investment uni-
verse. The limits might have been set on the
grounds that (i) pension funds should rejuve-
nate anemic local ﬁnancial markets; (ii) emerging
markets are ﬁnancially constrained and hence
should not be capital exporters; and (iii) pension
fund managers and supervisors are unfamiliar
with external investment opportunities, exacer-
bating portfolio risk and moral hazard. These
motives increasingly do not hold sway, and if not
reformed, could lead to rising asset shortages.
First, the overarching goal of any funded pen-
sion system is to maximize old-age retirement
wealth at tolerable risk levels. This goal should
not be subordinated to other commendable objec-
tives. Local markets are poorly correlated with
international markets, thus diversiﬁcation is likely
to pay off in the long term. Second, for crisis
prone economies, domestic systemic riskmakes it
advisable to partially rely onmore stable markets,
provided efﬁcient risk management policies are
in place in every AFP. Finally, it is not necessary
for the pension fundmanager to deal with foreign
asset selection directly, because many reputable
international global fundmanagers with excellent
track records can be hired at low cost, as they are
in many countries.
The limit on foreign investment and risky
domestic investable securities could be fur-
ther relaxed from the current levels to
reduce asset shortage problem. There is
strong evidence internationally that home bias
tends to result in strong suboptimality of port-
folios. Thus, it is not possible to justify a limit
on foreign investment on economic grounds. Ide-
ally, limits should be lax enough to allow AFPs
to use less restrictive risk management policies
and to eliminate the apparent excess demand
for local ﬁnancial instruments. Public offerings
have not shown the expected dynamism and have
largely lost their desirable characteristics (efﬁcient
pricing and liquidity). Asset-backed securities on
mortgages and other receivables, real estate, and
infrastructure projects should be given priority.
Regulatory Restrictions on Pension Funds in
Latin American Countries (as of April 2010)
(as a percentage of assets under manage-
ment)
Brazil
Assets Maximum limit
Government 100
Corporate debt 80
Equities 50
Real estate investment 8
Loans and ﬁnancing 15
Offshore investment 3
Source: SPC and J.P. Morgan.
Corporate Debt applies for high quality assets.
Colombia
Assets Maximum limit
Government (domestic and external) 50
Corporate bonds 40
Fogan/fogacoop 10
Mortgage security 40
Equity/soc. participations 40
Offshore issued assets (EQ+FI) 5
CDs 5
Source: Superﬁnanciera and J.P. Morgan.
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Uruguay
Assets Maximum limit
Sovereign debt 60
CB + Hipotecario bank 30
Onshore deposits 30
Hedge operations 10
Offshore ﬁxed income assets 15
Source: J.P. Morgan.
Peru
Assets Maximum
limit
Overall investment limits
Sovereign debt (A) 30
CB instruments (B) 30
Sovereign and CB
instruments (A) + (B)
40
Offshore holdings 30
Maximum limits by
funds
Fund
1
Fund 2 Fund 3
Local and offshore
equities
10 45 80
Bonds 100 75 70
Short-term
securities and cash
40 30 30
Derivatives 10 10 20
Source: SBS and J.P. Morgan.
Chile
Assets Fund A Fund B Fund C Fund D Fund E
Government
debt
60 60 60 60 60
Corporate
bonds (pri. +
pub)
30 30 10 10 3
Foreign
currency
investments (*)
50 40 35 25 15
Equities 80 60 40 20 5
CDs (Offshore) 15 15 15 15 15
Mutual Funds +
Invet. Funds
40 30 20 10 5
Overnight
deposits
2 2 2 2 2
Onshore
mutual funds
5 5 5 5 5
Source: SAF JP and J.P. Morgan.
Net of hedge positions: an overall limit of 30 percent of AUM
(unhedged) applies for the entire portfolio. The 15 percent limit
applies to the onshore portfolio.
Mexico
Assets Fund 1 Fund 2 Fund 3 Fund 4 Fund 5
Equities
(domestic +
foreign)
0 15 20 25 30
Foreign
currency
investment
30 30 30 30 30
Government
securities
no limit no limit no limit no limit no limit
International
ﬁxed income
20 20 20 20 20
Corporate debt no limit no limit no limit no limit no limit
Financial
institutions
no limit no limit no limit no limit no limit
Mortgage-
backed
securities
no limit no limit no limit no limit no limit
Semi-stat, state
and municipal
entities
no limit no limit no limit no limit no limit
VaR (currently
not published)
no limit no limit no limit no limit no limit
Source: Development Banks, non-bank banks, commercial
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Ms, has made it increasingly risky to invest in these regions,
s epitomized by the recent crisis. Also, from the Balassa-
amuelson (Samuelson, 1994) effect,3 we know that EMs should
xpect their real equilibrium exchange rate (REER) to appreci-
te over time, meaning that overseas investment in AEs will be
ubject to capital losses arising from exchange rate appreciation.
inally, the investments of Middle Eastern and Chinese investors
n AEs are being increasingly scrutinized, thereby creating con-
iderable uncertainty (as epitomized by the failure of Dubai
orld and CNOOC to acquire Western assets owing to political
pposition). Such uncertainty has made investment overseas less
ttractive, thereby reducing access to an important asset class.
.4.2. Increasing appetite for EM assets by AEs
As part of portfolio diversification, advanced country port-
olio managers have been increasingly investing part of their
ortfolios in EMs, thereby reducing the supply of domestic
nancial assets available to EM domestic investors.
. Theoretical modelAsset shortages can arise from many different factors as dis-
ussed above. The starting point is Elul (1997), who proved
hat unspecified market incompleteness can either increase or
3 The Balassa–Samuelson effect postulates that if the productivity growth
ifferential between the traded and non-traded goods sectors is larger in the
eveloping countries than in advanced ones, then the relative price of non-traded
o traded goods will be rising faster in the developing than in advanced countries,
eading to an exchange rate appreciation.
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ecrease interest rates in a generic Radner’s (1972) equilibrium
ith incomplete markets (in the context of a general equilib-
ium, Radner (1972) extended the Arrow–Debreu equilibrium,
n the first framework to be consistent with incomplete mar-
et framework). In the below, we restrict the source of asset
hortage in order to study its implications of asset price, eco-
omic growth and current account balance in a theoretical
ontent.
.1. Asset shortages and asset prices
First, we will show that lack of liquidity in the asset market
an lead to high asset prices, basing the model on Espinoza
t al. (2009). Trade takes place in an exchange economy (no
roduction), between two agents who want to trade across two
eriods, period 0 (now) and period f (future). Agents require cash
s a derived demand, because cash is needed before commodities
ransactions, and receipts of sales cannot be immediately used
o buy commodities.
Following, Espinoza et al. (2009), there are two different con-
epts of liquidity. First there is the supply of cash by the Central
ank, or by the banking system in general. Second, liquidity
efers to the easiness with which commodities and assets are
raded. For the purpose of current paper, we focus on the second
efinition of liquidity.
Intuitively, the model implies the cost of consumption is con-
tant across all states since all states have been assigned equal
eights, due to Cobb–Douglas utility specification. The cost of
onsumption is equal to price of the good (i.e. the opportunity
ost to transfer money—the Arrow–Debreu price, from period 0
o the next period f) multiplied by the value of trade in period f.
n period f, if state 1 has more liquidity than state 2, the value of
rade in state 1 must be higher than the value of trade in state 2,
ecause the quantity theory of money (i.e. the nominal activity
s equal to the supply of money) holds in the cash-in-advance
conomy (see Proposition 2). This is possible only under the
ondition that, the cost of transferring money in state 1 (i.e. the
tate price) is lower than the cost of transferring money in state
. As a result, the model suggests that a state with lower interest
ate is associated with high liquidity (see Proposition 1), is also
ttached with a lower state prices hence asset price, and vice
ersa.
The model is built around two periods, 0 (now) and f (future).
ach period is divided into sub-periods at which different com-
odity and money markets meet. The state of nature is revealed
fter the closure of the money market and default settlement
n period 0, and before the opening of the money market next
eriod. Similarly, default settlement in the future occurs after
he closure of the money market. For the purpose of our paper,
e assume money supply is exogenous and random. There are
possible states of nature, indexed by i∈N = {1,. . ., n} with
robabilities all equal to 1/n.
In addition to these n + 1 money markets, the two agents canrade n Arrow–Debreu securities (ADi)1 ≤ i≤ n that give 1 in state
and 0 in all other states j /= i. All Arrow–Debreu securities are
vailable for trade and therefore financial markets are complete
ith this structure. To ensure a positive value for money and
r
t
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ominal determinacy, a cash-in-advance model with default is
sed. Furthermore, default is only allowed in the money markets
or the sake of simplicity, because the model is in a complete
arket setting, any possible default in the asset market will
ffect the Arrow–Debreu state prices, so no real effect would be
enerated.
There are two agents, α and β in the model. For any
eriod or state of nature, each agent can pay b units of money
o buy b/p units of good, or can sell q units of good and
eceive pq unit of money. Hence consumption in each period or
tate is
= e − 1 + b
p
Notice, either q = 0(agent wants to buy) or b = 0 (agent wants
o sell), can happen in this one-commodity economy.
Agent α does not own any good in period 0 but owns e > 0
nits of the consumption good in the future, where e is non-
andom. Variables without subscript refer to agent α who will
e the borrower—while variables with superscript ‘*’ will refer
o agent β, who will be the lender. Agent α maximizes an
nter-temporal Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function with
iscount factor 1, and logarithmic felicity function u.
In period 0, agent α sells qADi securities at price θi to finance
onsumption at time 0.
In period future, state i, agent α has to give qADi to agent
. Since agent α cannot yet use the receipts of the goods he is
bout to sell, he borrows μi/1 + ri from the Central Bank to pay
gent β the qADi he owes him. He can then use the receipts of his
ales piqi to repay the short-term loan μi that he had contracted
ith the Central Bank. However, agent α defaults on a share di
f his repayment to the Central Bank. Therefore, agent α repays
nly μi(1 − di) to the Central Bank, and he incurs a utility cost
rom the total value defaulted, μidi, as in Shubik and Wilson
1977).
Agentα’s solves the following maximization problem subject
o certain constraints. The corresponding Lagrangian multipliers
re in the bracket.
max
b0,(qi,μi,qADi,di)i∈N
ln
(
b0
p0
)
+ 1
n
(∑
i∈N
ln(ei − qi) − λ max(diμi; 0)
)
s.t. b0 ≤
∑
i∈NθiqADi (ϕ)
∀i∈N qADi ≤ ηiμi (Ψi)
μi(1 − d) ≤ piqi (χi)
Agent β is endowed with e∗0 units of good in period 0, but has
othing in the future. He has the same preference as agent α.
In period 0, agent β sells q∗0 to agent α and invests the pro-
eeds to be consumed in the next period, lending to agent α
ith repayment conditional on the state of nature. However, heeceives the cash only at the end of period 0, after the securi-
ies market meets. He first borrows μ∗0/1 + r0 from the Central
ank. He will repay the loan with the receipts of his sales p0q∗0.
ince agent β also defaults by d∗0 , he will repay only μ∗0(1 − d∗0 ).
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In state i (period future), he receives the state-contingent
epayments from agent α and he uses to buy b∗i /pi units of
he consumption good. Therefore, agent β’s maximization is:
max
q∗0 ,(b∗i ,b∗ADi ,μ
∗
0 ,d
∗
0 )i∈N
ln(e∗0 − q∗0) +
1
n
(∑
i∈N
ln
(
b∗i
pi
)
− λ max(d∗0μ∗0; 0)
)
s.t.
∑
i∈Nb
∗
ADi
≤ η0μ∗0 (ϕ∗)
μ∗0(1 − d∗0 ) ≤ p0q∗0 (ξ∗)
∀i∈N b∗i ≤
b∗ADi
θi
(χ∗i )
A monetary equilibrium occurs in is the following set-
ing:agent maximizes utility;commodity markets clear.
In period 0, agent can buy q0 units of good with b0 units of
oney at price p0 on the other hand the agent can sell q0 units
f goods at price p0 and receive b0 units of money:
0 = b0
q∗0
⇔ p0q∗0 = b0
Similarly for future period, in all states
i∈N pi = b
∗
i
qi
⇔ piqi = b∗i
oney and AD security markets clear when
∗
0 = (1 + r0)M0 =
M0
η0
i.e. the total money demand equals to the money supplied by
he Central Bank in period 0
i∈N μi = (1 + ri)Mi = Mi
ηi
Similarly money demand equals supply in period future for
ll states d.
i∈N θiqADi = b∗ADi
This condition states the AD security clearing condition.
We will focus on the case with positive default to ensure
ositive interest rates and remove the nominal indeterminacy.
The following propositions determine the value of money and
re consistent with the quantity theory of money in a cash-in-
dvance model with active default (see also Espinoza et al., 2009
or proof).
roposition 1. Short-term interest rates – shows that short-
erm interest rates r0 are inversely related to the supply of money
0 by Central bank.
0 ≈ d∗0 = 1 − λM0
i∈N ri ≈ di = 1 − λMi
Note: Trade is itself determined by the quantity of money,hich is why only money supply appears in Proposition 1.
roposition 2. Quantity theory of money – shows that the
uantity Theory of Money holds in a liquidity-constrained
e
d
d
tment Finance 3 (2013) 22–40
conomy i.e. the nominal activity p0q∗0 = b0 is equal to the
upply of money M0.
0q
∗
0 = b0 = M0
i piqi = b∗i = M0
In what follows, we show liquidity can affect the AD state
rices.
The first order conditions for agentβ’s maximization problem
re: (Denote L the Lagrangian formed from β’s maximization
roblem).
∂L
∂q∗0
= −1
e∗0 − q∗0
+ p0ξ∗ = 0
∂L
∂b∗i
= 1
n
1
b∗i
− χ∗i = 0
∂L
∂μ∗0
= −λd∗0 + η0ϕ∗ − (1 − d∗0 )ξ∗ = 0
∂L
∂b∗ADi
= −ϕ∗ + χ
∗
i
θi
= 0
∂L
∂d∗0
= −λμ∗0 + d∗0ξ∗ = 0
Therefore, it can be deduced that:
ib
∗
i = θjb∗j
From Proposition 2, we have b∗i = piqi = Mi hence leading
o:
i > qj ⇔ Mi > Mj ⇔ b∗i > b∗j ⇔ θi < θj
In conclusion, the cost of consumption is equal to the cost of
ransferring money from period 0 to period f (i.e. state prices),
ultiplied by the value of trade in period f (i.e. the price of
he good multiplied by the volume traded). Under the quantity
heory of money, the value of trade is equal to the overall supply
f liquidity (i.e. b∗i = piqi = Mi). In particular, if there is less
iquidity in state 1 than state 2, the value of trade in state 1
as to be lower than the value in state 2, however according to
ib
∗
i = θjb∗j , this is only possible if the cost of financing in state
is higher, hence a higher state price is associated with a low
iquidity (volume of trade).
As observed in EMs, because of the shortage of financial
ssets, investors tend to hold on to the financial assets (i.e. q is
maller), meaning lower liquidity. This in turn leads to higher
D security prices.
. Asset shortage index
We define our asset shortages index by capturing the differ-
nce between demand and supply of financial assets. Domestic
emand for assets (latent asset demand) is proxied by gross
omestic savings (i.e., all the resources available to invest), while
he supply of financial assets is defined as domestic issuance of
evelopment Finance 3 (2013) 22–40 29
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Box 2: Flow of funds of assets.
The diagram below illustrates the foundation of
the asset shortage index, in which household sav-
ings is being invested in either liquid or nonliquid
ﬁnancial assets. On the demand side, enterprises,
government and households issue new loans,
bonds, or equity to ﬁnance their real investment
project (or consumption), ranging from a new
mortgage to a new enterprise. Alternatively, they
ﬁnance projects either by reducing short-term
assets or through foreign borrowing. According
to the system of national accounts, the national
ﬁnancial account comprises seven categories
of investment assets: (1) monetary gold; (2)
currency and deposits; (3) securities other than
shares; (4) loans; (5) shares and other equity;
(6) insurance technical reserves; and (7) other
accounts receivable. In our asset shortage index,
we have captured the currency and deposits,
loans, and shares and other equity.J. Chen, P. Imam / Review of D
onds, loans, and equity, as well as the net purchase of foreign
ssets and domestic assets by foreign investors. In addition, the
hange in short-term deposits also is considered to be adding to
he supply of financial asset, because it reflects the temporary
arking of funds, which could be motivated by a willingness to
old liquid assets as a precaution (see Box 2 for an illustration).4
To estimate our asset shortages (AS) index, we use the fol-
owing formula:
S = 1 −
(
B + E + L + ΔS.D. + NPFA
S
)
(1)
here S is the domestic national savings, B is the bond issuance
n the domestic market, E is the equity issuance in the domestic
arket, L is the loan issuance in the domestic market, and S.D.
s the short-term deposits. NPFA is the net purchase of foreign
nancial assets by domestic residents, which reflects the position
f domestic investors’ holdings of foreign assets (debt, equity,
nancial derivatives, other investments) minus the net position of
oreign investors’ holdings of domestic assets. The sum of B +
+ L + ΔS.D. + NPFA is therefore a reflection of the supply
f financial assets.
Making use of available data, we constructed our asset short-
ge index for 41 EMs from 1996 to 2008.5 Depending on the
ssuing country and issuing market, we combined a number of
atabases to obtain the most comprehensive data set that is con-
istent across countries. The variables used to construct the Asset
hortage Index are as follows:
Gross national savings. The data for gross national sav-
ings reflect gross national disposable income subtracted by
total expenditure; it represents economic resources available
for investment. The dataset on gross domestic savings was
obtained from the World Development Index (WDI) or was
constructed from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) when
WDI data were not available.
4 The supply of financial asset is modeled in the same spirit as Caballero
t al. (2008), who defined the supply of financial asset as Vt = δPVt , where
Vt denote the present value of the economy’s future output, and the parameter
represents the share of PVt that can be capitalized today and transformed
nto a tradable asset hence the total asset issued in domestic economy. The δ
arameter captures the level of financial development in an economy, intuitively
or a given level of future output, a higher δ implies domestic agent (enterprise,
overnment or household) can borrow more against their future income, this is
quivalent as saying agents can issue more financial assets (Bond, Equity and
oans). Furthermore the financial asset demand is also modeled in a similar
ay as Caballero et al. (2008). Under a closed economy setting, assuming agent
ive for an infinite period, Caballero et al. (2008) modeled the asset demand for
omestic asset equal to the total national output, in our case the demand of the
omestic asset is equal to domestic asset demandt = St − ΔS.D.t − NPFAt .
5 The EMs are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
enezuela, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
aiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait,
orocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, UAE, Bulgaria, Croatia,
zech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak
epublic, Slovenia, Ukraine.
The remaining terms, for the purposes of the AS-
Index are unlikely to be signiﬁcant. For example,
monetary gold is only an investment option for
the central banks. Also, the level of monetary gold
reserves in the central bank does not vary from
year to year, so in the overall economy monetary
gold has very little relevance to asset shortages.
Insurance technical reserves is very small in EMs,
and data limitationsmade it impossible to include
it in our index. Other accounts receivable is in
general small in EMs; limited andunderdeveloped
credit ratings data make it difﬁcult for companies
to assess the risk of lending. Moreover, the dura-
tion of such a transaction is very short, limiting its
importance.
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asset demand is not being addressed rapidly by capital markets,
which could reflect impediments to asset creation.
6 We noticed that the Arellano-Bond test statistics are ‘too’ high in some of
the regression specifications, which poses potential problem - invalidity of the
instruments, however panel fixed effect estimations are also implemented in
parallel as robustness check. The results are similar between two estimation0 J. Chen, P. Imam / Review of D
Bond, equity, and loan issuance. Dealogic records all the
domestic issuances of bonds, equity and loan. For each coun-
try, the bond, loan and equity issuances were aggregated for
each year.
Net purchase of foreign ﬁnancial assets. In an open econ-
omy, when a domestic resident purchases assets overseas
(debt, equity, financial derivative, other investments), it rep-
resents an increase in the supply of financial assets for the
domestic investor. Similarly, when a foreigner buys domestic
assets, this is equivalent to a reduction in domestic financial
assets available to domestic investors. Foreign institutional
investors’ interest in emerging markets has surged in recent
years, because of improved sovereign liability management,
resulting in a secular increase in demand for both external and
local EM asset classes. Increases in privatization, improve-
ments in investment climate, and easing of capital account
regulations, resulting in a rapid rise in the share of the investable
portion of the local equity market, have also attracted foreign
institutional investor participation. Data for net purchase of
foreign financial assets are obtained from balance of payment
statistics.
Change in short-term deposits. Part of an economic agent’s
assets is parked in short-term deposits, as a precaution against
uncertainty, for instance. Investors can temporarily park funds
as short-term deposits, creating a temporary investment vehi-
cle. Data for short-term deposits are obtained from Bankscope,
which aggregates all the banks’ balance sheets to construct
short-term deposits in an economy.
It is clear from the asset shortage index that, in recent years,
sset shortage has become a rising issue in EMs, with few
ountries left out (Fig. 2). The four snapshots—1996, 2000,
005, and 2008—indicate that asset shortage is a general EM
roblem, with slight regional variations (e.g., the Middle East,
hich benefited from the oil windfall, and East Asia, which ben-
fited from the manufacturing boom) and with some variations
ver time.
Issuance of financial assets has been on an upward trend
egionally—until the recent crisis—but with low levels rel-
tive to GDP (negative numbers mean that the reduction in
ash deposits outweighs issuance of bonds, equity, and loans).
egional variations are striking. East Asia, the Middle East, and
frica appear to have the highest issuance of financial assets,
hile Latin America and Eastern Europe lag behind (Fig. 3).
Bond and loan issuance has been the principal source of
nancial assets in EMs, with equity issuance starting only in
he mid-2000s. While the Asian crisis has dented some of the
upply of bonds, in the last decade there has been a rise in both
omestic bond issuance and loan issuance, though the latter has
een a sharp fall during the global crisis. Equity issuance, on the
ther hand, started growing rapidly only in 2005, from very low
evels, and was negatively affected by the crisis. Net purchase
f foreign financial assets, while initially positive, has turned
egative in recent years as domestic investors have started to
ick up foreign financial assets, suggesting that foreigners are
uying relatively more domestic financial assets (Fig. 4).
p
t
r
2ment Finance 3 (2013) 22–40
. Empirical estimation
.1. Methodology
We will proceed by estimating the determinants of the asset
hortage (AS) index. In macroeconomic panel regressions, var-
ous estimation issues are encountered that must be addressed
o make appropriate inferences. The first major hurdle is the
mitted variables bias, which can lead to possible correlation
etween the regressors and the error term. Second, two-way
ausality between the dependent variable and the explanatory
ariables is likely to be present, which leads to inconsistent esti-
ators. The third problem—specific to dynamic panels—is the
dynamics panel bias,’ from the inevitable correlation between
he lagged dependent variable and country-specific fixed effects.
Alvarez and Arellano, 2003).
System-GMM is used instead to carry out the estimations
Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell
nd Bond, 1998). While it still might suffer from weak instru-
ent bias, it provides consistent and more efficient estimators.
t reduces the bias by incorporating more moment conditions,
ith these additional moment restrictions also being tested. The
egressions are run on first-difference and not on levels, owing to
oncerns about trending variables and unit root. The test statis-
ics indicate that the instruments are valid,6 and that there is no
erial correlation in the error term, which allows us to carry on
ith the system-GMM method. We can therefore proceed with
he following estimation (results are in Table 1):
ssent Shortage Indexit = β1 A.S. Indexit−1 + β2 ln(ΔGDPit)
+β3 inflationit + β4Δ real interest rateit
+β5 country′s credit ratingit−1 + β6 RERit−1
+β7 Govt. fiscal blanceit + β8 Govt. Stabilityit
+β9 World GDP Growthit + β10X + εit (2)
ith the variables and their sources defined in Appendix 1. The
ariables were chosen on theoretical grounds.
.2. Key ﬁndings
There is strong evidence of asset shortage persistence. An
sset shortage in the previous period has a negative impact on
sset shortages in the current period, with significance at the 1%
evel. This implies that the imbalance between asset supply androcedures moreover, estimation results on other variables are consistent with
he existing literature therefore we believe the results from GMM estimation
eflects the true estimates with certain degree of consistency (see Roodman,
006).
J
.Chen,P
.Im
am
/R
eview
ofD
evelopm
entFinance
3(2013)22–40
31
Table 1
System GMM regression output for macroeconomic variables explanation of the index.
Independent variables Asset Shortage index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A.S. Index (t− 1) 0.289*** 0.266*** 0.262*** 0.292*** 0.280*** 0.283*** 0.293*** 0.285*** 0.288***
(0.046) (0.041) (0.072) (0.046) (0.048) (0.049) (0.045) (0.047) (0.051)
Log GDP 0.0577** 0.063** 0.074 0.058* 0.052* 0.075** 0.068** 0.061** 0.057**
(0.0282) (0.028) (0.048) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
Inflation 0.0433 0.048 0.069 0.046 0.045 0.049 0.043 0.047 0.042
(0.0330) (0.034) (0.052) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031)
Real interest rate −0.00748 −0.012 0.004 −0.003 −0.008 −0.009 −0.004 −0.006 −0.008
(0.0167) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Country’s credit rating (t− 1) −0.0976 −0.032 −0.071 −0.103 −0.074 −0.083 −0.063 −0.100 −0.096
(0.0691) (0.082) (0.089) (0.071) (0.083) (0.070) (0.073) (0.067) (0.069)
De facto exchange rate (t− 1) 0.0467 −0.006 −0.049 0.047 0.037 0.046 0.041 0.045 0.049
(0.0896) (0.082) (0.157) (0.092) (0.091) (0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.085)
Government fiscal bal. (t− 1) 1.620* 0.574 1.878 1.690* 1.427 1.657* 1.320 1.849** 1.544*
(0.917) (1.166) (1.258) (0.933) (0.944) (0.898) (0.938) (0.846) (0.901)
Government stability −0.105* −0.089 −0.130 −0.107* −0.098* −0.107* −0.111* −0.103* −0.104*
(0.0590) (0.062) (0.080) (0.059) (0.056) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.056)
World GDP growth −4.728* −4.849* −4.132 −4.580* −4.761* −6.331** −5.400** −4.601* −4.765*
(2.396) (2.388) (2.719) (2.423) (2.356) (2.618) (2.445) (2.386) (2.468)
Openness (t− 1) −0.004*
(0.002)
Log GDP per capita (t− 1) −0.043
(0.064)
Crisis dummy (t− 1) −0.570**
(0.215)
Regional dummy (Latin America.) 0.165
(0.169)
Regional dummy (East Asia) 0.032
(0.196)
US nominal interest rate −0.109***
(0.039)
Corruption (t− 1) −0.120*
(0.064)
Dependency ratio −0.892
(1.107)
Common law (UK legal origin) −0.045
(0.210)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first
differences
0.214 0.205 0.469 0.199 0.210 0.142 0.217 0.210 0.213
Hansen test of override restrictions 0.986 0.985 0.985 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.981 0.982 0.980
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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A stable macroeconomic environment—proxied by low
nflation—encourages the issuance of financial assets, because
t reduces the level of risk, though the statistical significance of
his variable is not always strong.
A country’s credit rating has no significant power in explain-
ng asset shortages. This means investors are less concerned
bout a country’s credit rating when making investment deci-
ions.
Change in real interest rates is not statistically significant in
xplaining the AS index, suggesting that interest rates do not act
s an equilibrium force between supply and demand for assets
n EMs. Under the incomplete market setting that characterizes
Ms, this is to be expected, because savings and the supply of
nancial assets do not necessarily respond rapidly to interest rate
ignals in these cases, because of information and transaction
osts, for instance. The supply of financial assets is inelastic to
nterest rates and dependent on other factors.
The exchange rate regime is insignificant in explaining the
S index. The impact of a stable exchange rate is theoretically
mbiguous. We could have expected that a stable exchange rate
olicy, by reducing exchange rate risk, would make issuance of
c
m
s90–2009 (as a share of GDP).
nancial assets in overseas markets more attractive. At the same
ime, domestic savers might prefer to park their savings overseas
o diversify away from risk.
Government fiscal balance has a positive impact on the AS
ndex. As expected, countries in better fiscal positions have
ower AS indexes. Although a small budget deficit—the raw
aterial for securitized government debt—is needed to create
benchmark on how to price other financial assets and thereby
ncourages the supply of financial assets, large deficits have an
nverse impact on the AS index by creating instability. However,
t is not significant across all specifications of the regres-
ions, presumably because the explanatory variable is highly
o-linear.
World growth appears to have a small, but statistically sig-
ificant impact on reducing asset shortages. The coefficients on
orld GDP growth are all negative and significant at 10% or 5%
evels. Why this finding? First, domestic exporting companies
ill increase their investment level, hence issuing more finan-ial assets. In addition, higher world growth makes foreign assets
ore attractive to domestic investors, leading to an outflow of
avings overseas.
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Openness, as measured by world trade, has a negative, though
eakly significant, impact on the AS index. Globalization has in
ost cases proceeded gradually, liberalizing trade before liber-
lizing the capital account. As the domestic economy becomes
ore integrated into the world economy, an EM can improve its
elfare by specializing in products in which it has a compar-
tive advantage, thereby increasing its income. Initially, if the
apital account is still closed, the domestic firm will issue more
nancial assets domestically, thereby reducing the AS index.
GDP per capita is insignificant in explaining the AS index.
his means that asset shortage is not explained by the level of
conomic development and can affect rich Gulf countries as
uch as Latin American countries.
The coefficient of the crisis dummy is negative and significant
t the 1% level. This reflects the fact that, during a crisis, savings
all more rapidly than does the issuance of financial assets and
s consistent with the view that savings collapse during a crisis,
hereby reducing the asset shortage imbalance.
Change in corruption has a negative coefficient and is statis-
ically significant, though only at the 10% level. By increasing
ncertainty, and hence the cost of doing business, asset issuance
ecomes less likely. Therefore, the more corrupt countries have
igger asset shortage problems.
o
i
tmarkets, 1990–2008 (as a share of GDP).
US interest rates have a negative and significant explana-
ory power in the AS index. As overseas asset returns increase,
hey become, relatively speaking, more attractive to domestic
nvestors. The resulting large capital outflow effectively reduces
omestic asset shortages.
The dependency ratio—the ratio of individuals under 15 or
ver 65 relative to the working population—does not have a sta-
istically significant impact on asset shortages. We would expect
hat as the dependency ratio falls in EMs, rising incomes and
avings should initially outpace the supply of financial assets.
owever, as our group of EMs is heterogeneous, cultural and
nstitutional differences could explain the variation in the sav-
ng rates, independent of the dependency ratio. Also, income,
egardless of the dependency ratio, might be unequally dis-
ributed in many EMs.
Regional variations do not appear to explain the AS index.
oth the Latin America and East Asia regional dummies are
tatistically insignificant in explaining asset shortages. If we
nalyze institutional differences, as proxied by the difference
etween common law jurisdictions (as proxied by UK legal
rigin) from civil law ones, we do not have a statistically signif-
cant effect either. Although La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) suggest
hat common law is associated with more dynamic economies,
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Table 2
Fixed effect/random effect estimations for the Asset Shortage index.
Independent variables Asset Shortage index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
K.A. openness (t− 1) −0.184* −0.213*** −0.188* −0.200** −0.189* −0.221*** −0.207* −0.223***
(0.103) (0.082) (0.109) (0.087) (0.108) (0.084) (0.107) (0.084)
Business freedom (t− 1) −0.027** −0.033*** −0.028** −0.033*** −0.029** −0.034*** −0.030** −0.034***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
Financial freedom (t− 1) −0.004 −0.006 −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.005 −0.004 −0.005
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Property rights (t− 1) 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.024** 0.018** 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.021** 0.018**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Economics risk (t− 1) −0.009 −0.021
(0.027) (0.024)
Government stability (t− 1) 0.026 −0.008
(0.067) (0.062)
Law and order (t− 1) 0.253 0.082
(0.160) (0.119)
Constant 0.927 1.693** 1.315 2.441** 0.771 1.814** 0.370 1.499*
(0.879) (0.692) (1.396) (1.096) (1.028) (0.859) (0.972) (0.772)
Observations 442 442 432 432 432 432 432 432
R-squared (overall) 0.048 0.070 0.055 0.076 0.049 0.073 0.035 0.067
Number of id 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
*
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ecause it protects creditors more strongly, we find this effect
oes not matter for asset shortages. This means that imbalances
n savings and financial assets are not affected by institutional
ifferences or region-specific factors.
.3. Regulation
Regulations are another important determinant of asset
hortages. So far, our analysis has focused primarily on macro-
conomic variables, but institutional factors also affect asset
hortages. In what follows we will study the impact on asset
hortages of regulations imposed by national authorities. In
Ms, the regulatory environment is often very stringent, which
ould be a reason for the large AS index. Econometrically, using
ystem-GMM is complicated by the fact that most regulatory
ariables are dummy variables or variables that contain limited
ariance, making it difficult to obtain a set of valid instruments.
urthermore, when regulations are implemented, asset shortages
re typically not a major consideration, such that reverse causal-
ty (from asset shortages to regulation variables or when these
ndicators were constructed they did not take asset shortage into
onsideration) is likely to be weak. We use the Hausman test
not reported) to estimate the relative efficiency of fixed versus
andom estimation. As it cannot be rejected, we use RE. The
andom effects can yield a more efficient estimator; however,
andom effects do not always guarantee a consistent estimator.
We estimate the following regression:ssent Shortage indexit = β1 capital account opennessit−1
+β2lnst. democracyit−1 + β3 business freedomit−1
a
r
b
a+β4 business freedomit−1 + β5 property rightsit−1
+β6X + εit (3)
Capital account openness, institutional democracy, financial
reedom, property rights, and institutional investors’ regulations,
nd other variables are added to the regression individually.
ote that the R-squared measure of goodness of fit is quite low
see Table 2). This is not unexpected, as we are using regula-
ion variables on the right hand side, which, because of lack of
ranularity, have low variability.
The coefficients of capital account openness are negative and
ignificant. Capital account openness is a variable constructed by
hinn and Ito (2008) and is an index that measures the extent of
estrictions on external accounts, with a higher value reflecting
ore open cross-border capital transactions. This result suggests
hat by widening the investment universe for domestic institu-
ional investors in EMs, and allowing savings to be invested
verseas, the domestic AS problem is reduced.
The business freedom index is statistically signiﬁcant and
egative, suggesting that a friendlier business environment
educes the AS index. The business freedom score is composed
f various factors with equal weights: procedures, time, cost,
nd minimum capital for starting a business, obtaining a license
nd the time, cost recovery rate for closing a business. The busi-
ess freedom index ranges from 0 to 100; a higher value implies
more friendly business environment. As the business envi-
onment improves, investors will find it easier to create new
usinesses and invest, thereby increasing the supply of financial
ssets and decreasing the asset shortage.
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moving too far from fundamentals. Local market booms tend not
to persist indefinitely, and there is a need to protect retirement
savings from the swings that characterize most small and open
7 Development of hedging instruments is also important. In this regard, the
surge in the use of derivates to hedge currency and interest rate risk bodes well
for more complete capital markets. Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore have a
well-developed interest rate, futures, and currency swap market, respectively,
while in countries with capital account restrictions (e.g., China and India), use6 J. Chen, P. Imam / Review of D
The ﬁnancial freedom index, stronger property rights, and
acroeconomic risks have no signiﬁcant impact on asset short-
ges. The financial freedom index is a measure of government
ntervention in the financial markets, with higher numbers rep-
esenting fewer regulations imposed by the government. Our
nding shows that countries with stronger government interven-
ion in capital markets do not have larger asset shortages than
ess interventionist countries. Stronger property rights are not
ound to lead to greater issuance of financial assets. Intuitively,
t would be expected that stronger property rights, by increas-
ng protection, should be good for asset issuance. As EMs are
till catching up, and therefore use existing technologies to grow,
tronger property rights may in fact be bad for growth by hinder-
ng the copying of existing technologies, and hence increasing
sset shortages. Only when countries have reached sufficiently
dvanced development will property rights be good for asset
ssuance (Chang, 2001).
Economic risk—a measure of the overall macroeconomic
nvironment—is shown to have insigniﬁcant effects on the
S index. The index is a composite of GDP, growth, infla-
ion, balanced budget, and current accounts. This suggests that
mproving economic stability does not matter for our countries,
erhaps because the countries in our sample are stable enough
o generate financial assets.
Law and order has a positive but insigniﬁcant impact on
sset shortages.This suggests that a stronger legal system, which
rotects investors more solidly, will not lead to the issuance of
ore financial assets relative to national savings.
We can conclude that the ease of doing business, rather than
conomic stability, matters the most in reducing asset short-
ges. However, macroeconomic factors, as well as regulation
ariables, also affect asset shortages.
. Conclusion and policy implications
In this paper, an index to proxy the asset shortages in EMs
y capturing the difference between the demand and supply of
nancial assets was constructed. This allowed the analysis of
he evolution of asset shortages over time. To our knowledge,
his is the first such measure to have been constructed. This
ndex provides a quantitative measure to study the macroecono-
ic implications of asset shortages, which is explored in second
aper of the series – Danger of Asset shortages (see Chen and
mam, 2012), in conclusion we found that asset shortages have
negative impact on economic growth in the long run. Second,
sset shortages are a significant source of asset bubbles over
ime and thereby increase the probability of a crisis. Last, asset
hortages are a leading explanatory variable in current account
urpluses.
Given the danger that asset shortages pose for EMs, it is
rucial for policy makers to tackle the problem sooner rather than
ater. The arguments do not apply just to EMs, but even more so
o frontier markets—the subset of emerging markets with small
nd illiquid market capitalizations—because the consequences
f asset shortages are particularly strong there. Several policy
mplications can be drawn:
o
t
i
pment Finance 3 (2013) 22–40
.1. Capital market development
To spur the supply of financial assets, developing the capi-
al market further is crucial. Improving the efficiency of capital
arkets helps increase access to financing for the private sector,
owering the cost of financing, distributing risk, and supporting
ong-term growth. For example, Peru, Chile, and Colombia have
mplemented measures to integrate their stock exchanges, poten-
ially overtaking Mexico as Latin America’s second-largest
arket. This will facilitate cross-border transactions in stocks
nd increase trading volume as the greater size and diversity of
n integrated stock exchange will lure more investors, such as
ocal pension funds for whom cross-border investments could
hen be considered a local rather than foreign asset.
.2. Regulation to increase supply
The authorities should clarify legislation and modify regu-
ations to spur the supply of new financial assets. Regulatory
estrictions on the investment of pension funds in Latin Ameri-
an countries in nontraditional instruments (private equity, real
state, lower-rated fixed income products, etc.) and illiquid
ssets in the stock market have limited the opportunities for
rowth. Liberalizing these investment restrictions, by widening
he investment universe, could increase investment opportuni-
ies for EM investors, especially institutional ones. In most
Ms, the market for covered mortgage loans is underdeveloped,
iven vague legal and regulatory frameworks on the treatment
f covered bonds in cases of bankruptcy, collateral and match-
ng requirements, and valuation issues. Addressing these issues
ould pave the way for the growth of covered bond markets in
any EMs. Similar reforms may be needed to create an asset
acked securities (ABS) market for mortgages.
Rules should be set in place to increase the supply of assets
urther by enforcing a minimum amount of assets that must be
isted on a stock exchange. For example, in 2010, the Ministry
f Finance in India announced new rules for companies listed
n Indian bourses, requiring them to make available, within 5
ears, a minimum of 25% of equity, as opposed to the existing
0%. This should raise liquidity, and thereby reduce volatility.7
Regulators should remove or reduce the limit on how much
nstitutional investors are allowed by law to invest overseas. This
ould allow the system to mitigate the excessive exposure to
omestic systemic risk and the risk of domestic security pricesf the nondeliverable forward market is widespread. Furthermore, encouraging
he inclusion of an asset class or individual securities issues in major global
ndices would provide foreign institutional investors with a measure of their
erformance benchmarks.
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conomies. Local markets are poorly correlated with interna-
ional markets, and thus diversification is likely to pay off in the
ong term. Furthermore, for crisis-prone economies, domestic
ystemic risk makes it advisable to partially rely on more stable
arkets. Finally, it is not necessary for the pension fund manager
o deal with foreign asset selection directly, because many rep-
table international global fund managers with excellent track
ecords can be hired at low cost.
The business environment should be improved. Encouraging
ntrepreneurs to expand by using capital markets is an important
tep in increasing asset supply. Too often, going public, which
aises the company’s visibility, leads to regulatory hurdles and
ncreased costs, thereby discouraging asset issuance.
.3. Reducing savingsOne reason EMs have large savings rates is as a precautionary
ool. Increasing consumption can therefore also help EMs reduce
sset shortages. This can be achieved by:
A
his table shows the description of the data used and their sources. All variables are a
eries Name Description
ross domestic product (current US
dollars)
Gross domestic product at current price i
converted from domestic currencies usin
rates.
ross domestic product per capita
(current US dollars)
GDP divided by total population.
ross domestic saving Defined as Gross National Disposable In
Expenditures. Data is converted from dom
average official exchange rates.
ond issuance in domestic (foreign)
market
Data is converted from domestic currenc
exchange
oan issuance in domestic (foreign)
market
Data is converted from domestic currenc
exchange
quity issuance in domestic (foreign)
market
Data is converted from domestic currenc
exchange
hort term deposits Data is converted from domestic currenc
exchange
et position of foreign holding of
domestic assets
Foreigner’s asset minus liabilities positio
investable assets and other investments.
et position of domestic holding of
foreign assets
Domestic investor’s asset minus liabilitie
other investable assets and other investm
eal interest rate Nominal interest rate taken away inflatio
nflation Inflation as measured by the log annual g
product implicit deflator. We use the CPI
available.
iscal deficit The overall budget is total expenditure an
current and capital revenue and official g
percentage of GDP. Data available for ce
nstitutional regulation Constructed from AREAER’s provisions
(including: Insurance companies, Pensio
collective, excluding banks). The restrict
and foreign assets. Due to data availabili
report over the period we are interested,
= restriction exist, otherwise it is 0.
orld GDP The IMF revised the reporting format for
1996, when it started to provide more de
liberalization. Before 1996, the IMF mea
liberalization is a simple dummy variablement Finance 3 (2013) 22–40 37
Strengthening social safety nets. High saving rates in EMs
(e.g., China) have been described as a reflection of high
individual risk, related to costs of health, retirement, and edu-
cation. Therefore it is important to improve the ability of
individuals to insure against the risks. For example, in 2008
China expanded the ‘Yi Bao’ (a Chinese state health care
system) to 229 cities.
Loosening fiscal policy. Following past crises, governments
in EMs have been reluctant to spend money, even if the
social rate of return is very high, for fear of over-indebting
themselves. However, the positive externality of government
spending on growth, such as infrastructure for example, could
be even more important if it leads to the supply of finan-
cial assets that could spur further development of capital
markets.ppendix 1. Series description and data sources
nnual and at the country level.
Source
n US dollars. GDP data is
g yearly average official exchange
IMF: world economics outlook;
World Bank: world development
indicators
IMF: world economics outlook;
World Bank: world development
indicators
come subtracts Total
estic currencies using yearly
IMF: international financial statistics,
world economic outlook; World
Bank: world development indicators
ies using yearly average official Dealogic
ies using yearly average official Dealogic
ies using yearly average official Dealogic
ies using yearly average official Bankscope
ns in domestic debt, equity, other IMF: balance of payments
s positions in foreign debt, equity,
ents.
IMF: balance of payments
n. World Bank: world development
indicators
rowth rate of the gross domestic
if the GDP-deflator is not
IMF: world economics outlook;
World Bank: world development
indicators
d lending minus repayments less
rant received; shown as
ntral government only
Haver analytics
specific to institutional investors
n funds, Investment firms and
ion is on holding of both domestic
ty and changing format of the
the outcome is a binary number, 1
IMF: annual report on exchange
arrangements and exchange
restrictions (AREAER)
capital account restrictions in
tails on aspects of capital account
sure of capital account
.
World Bank: world development
indicators
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Series Name Description Source
Degree of capital account openness
(kaopen)
Constructed base on the four binary dummy variables: 1, presence of
multiple exchange rates; 2, restrictions on current account transactions; 3,
restrictions on capital account transactions and 4, requirement of the
surrender of export proceeds reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). These
variables are to provide information on the extent and nature of the
restrictions on external accounts. Higher the number means more capital
account openness.
Chinn and Ito (2008)
De facto exchange rate The number ranging from 1–6, 1 meaning de factor peg Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
Real exchange rate Number of foreign currency per 1 domestic currency IMF: international financial statistics
Institutionalized democracy Democracy is conceived as three elements. 1, the presence of institutions
and procedures through which citizens can express effective preference
about alternative policies and leaders. 2, the existence of institutionalized
constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. 3, the guarantee of
civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political
participations. The indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0–10)
Policy IV project – University of
Maryland
Education attainment (secondary) Set of Panel data recording the education attainment in 146 countries from
1950 to 2010.
Barro and Lee (2010)
Trade openness (total trade) Sum of imports and exports of goods and services over GDP IMF: balance of payments
Government fiscal balance IMF: government finance statistics,
staff report; Haver analytics
External debt IMF: international financial statistics;
Staff report
Government debt IMF: government finance statistics,
Staff report
Government revenue IMF: government finance statistics,
Staff report
Country credit rating Short term Credit Rating for each country we are interested over
1990–2009
Fitch
Government stability ICRG political risk sub-component (12%) weight. This is a measure both
of the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its
ability to stay in office. This will depend on the type of governance, the
cohesion of the government and governing party or parties, the closeness
of the next election, the government’s command of the legislature, and
popular approval of government policies.
Political risk services: international
country risk guide
Crisis 1 indicates the date of the crisis started; the dataset covers the universe of
systemic banking crises for the period 1970–2007.
Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Economic risk rating The value of the Political Risk Service (PRS) Group’s economic risk
indicator (which ranges between 0 and 50). The risk rating is a
combination of 5 subcomponents: GDP levels and growth, respectively,
inflation, balanced budgets, and the current account. The minimum number
of points for each component is zero, while the maximum number of points
depends on the fixed weight that component is given in the overall
economic risk assessment.
Political risk services: international
country risk guide
Corruption ICRG political risk sub-component (6%) weight. This is a measure of
corruption within the political system. Such corruption: distorts the
economic and financial environment, reduces the efficiency of government
and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through
patronage rather than ability, and introduces an inherent instability into the
political process. The most common form of corruption met directly by
business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special
payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange
controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. Although the PRS
measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with
actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism,
job reservations, “favor-for-favors,” secret party funding, and suspiciously
close ties between politics and business. In PRS’s view these sort of
corruption pose risk to foreign business, potentially leading to popular
discontent, unrealistic and inefficient controls on the state economy, and
encourage the development of the black market.
Political risk services: international
country risk guide
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Series Name Description Source
Law and order ICRG political risk sub-component (6%) weight. PRS assess Law and
Order separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to three
points. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and
impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an
assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a
high rating (3.0) in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating (1.0) if the
law is ignored for a political aim.
Political risk services: international
country risk guide
Risk for exchange rate stability Ranging from high % change of either 0.0–9.9 appreciation or depreciation
of 0.1–4.9 with risk points at 10.0, to a midpoint of either appreciation at
50.0+ or depreciation of 30.0–34.9 with risk points at 5.0 to a low
depreciation of 100.0+ with 0.0 points. The higher the points, the lower the
risk. (Refer to ICRG Methodology for maximum points for this variable, as
well as for related formulas for calculating risk.)
Political risk services: international
country risk guide
Risk for inflation Ranging from high % of 130+ with risk points at 0.0, to a low of 0.0 with
10.0 points. The higher the points, the lower the risk. (Refer to ICRG
Methodology for maximum points for this variable, as well as for related
formulas for calculating risk.)
Political risk services: international
country risk guide
Business freedom Business Freedom is a quantitative measure of the ability to start, operate,
and close a business that represents the overall burden of regulation, as
well as the efficiency of government in the regulatory process. The
business freedom score for each country is a number between 0 and 100,
with 100 equaling the freest business environment. The Score is based on
10 factors, using data from the World Bank’s Doing Business study.
The heritage foundation
Financial freedom Financial freedom is a measure of banking security as well as a measure of
independence from government control. State ownership of banks and
other financial institutions is an inefficient burden that reduces competition
and generally lowers the level of available services. It has scale between 0
to 100, 100 means negligible government influence.
The heritage foundation
Property rights Property rights component is an assessment of the ability of individuals to
accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced
by the state. It measures the degree to which a country’s law protect private
property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those
laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property will be
expropriated and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence
of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and
businesses to enforce contracts. It has scale between 0 and 100, 100 means
Private property is guaranteed by the government
The heritage foundation
Local sovereign yield Haver analytics
External sovereign credit EMBIC spread
Price to rent ratio Global property indicator
Price and earning ratio Bloomberg; IBES
Commodity prices index The index is constructed using a set of weighted commodity prices,
s; Co
IMF commodity index
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